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Abstract
Post-hoc interpretability approaches have been
proven to be powerful tools to generate explana-
tions for the predictions made by a trained black-
box model. However, they create the risk of hav-
ing explanations that are a result of some artifacts
learned by the model instead of actual knowledge
from the data. This paper focuses on the case of
counterfactual explanations and asks whether the
generated instances can be justified, i.e. contin-
uously connected to some ground-truth data. We
evaluate the risk of generating unjustified counter-
factual examples by investigating the local neigh-
borhoods of instances whose predictions are to be
explained and show that this risk is quite high for
several datasets. Furthermore, we show that most
state of the art approaches do not differentiate justi-
fied from unjustified counterfactual examples, lead-
ing to less useful explanations.
1 Introduction
Among the soaring number of methods proposed to gener-
ate explanations for a machine learning classifier, post-hoc
interpretability aproaches [Guidotti et al., 2018b] have been
the subject of debates recently in the community [Rudin,
2018]. By generating explanations for the predictions of a
trained predictive model without using any knowledge about
it whatsoever (treating it as a black-box), these systems are
inherently flexible enough to be used in any situation (model,
task...) by any user, which makes them popular today in var-
ious industries. However, their main downside is that, under
these assumptions, there is no guarantee that the built expla-
nations are faithful to the original data that were used to train
the model.
This is in particular the case for counterfactual example
approaches that, based on counterfactual reasoning (see e.g.
[Bottou et al., 2013]), aim at answering the question: given
a classifier and an observation, how is the prediction al-
tered when the observation changes? In the context of classi-
fication, they identify the minimal perturbation required to
change the predicted class of a given observation: a user
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is thus able to understand what features locally impact the
prediction and therefore how it can be changed. Among
interpretability methods, counterfactual examples have been
shown to be useful solutions [Wachter et al., 2018] that can
be easily understood and thus directly facilitate decisions for
a user.
However, without any guarantee on existing data, counter-
factual examples in the post-hoc paradigm are vulnerable to
issues raised by the robustness of the classifier, leading to ex-
planations that are arguably not satisfying in the context of
interpretability. More generally, this paper argues that a cru-
cial property a counterfactual example should satisfy is that
it should be connected to the training data of the classifier.
Formally, we define this relation using the notion of connect-
edness and argue that there should be a continuous path be-
tween a counterfactual and an instance from the training data,
as discussed and defined in Section 3.
This paper aims at showing that generating such post-hoc
counterfactual explanations can be difficult. The contribu-
tions are the following:
• We propose an intuitive desideratum for more relevant
counterfactual explanations, based on ground-truth la-
belled data, that helps generating better explanations.
• We design a test to highlight the risk of having undesir-
able counterfactual examples disturb the generation of
counterfactual explanations.
• We apply this test to several datasets and classifiers and
show that the risk of generating undesirable counterfac-
tual examples is high.
• Additionally, we design a second test and show that state
of the art post-hoc counterfactual approaches may gen-
erate unjustified explanations.
Section 2 is devoted to discussing the state of the art of
post-hoc interpretability and counterfactual explanations, as
well as presenting studies related to this work. Section 3 pro-
poses a definition for ground-truth backed counterfactual ex-
planations that we use in this paper. In Section 4, the central
procedure of this paper is proposed, which aims at assessing
the risk of generating unjustified counterfactual explanations,
and experimental results are shown. Finally, the vulnerabil-
ity of methods from the literature to this risk is evaluated in
Section 5.
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2 Background
This section presents some existing interpretability methods
and analyses that have been already conducted.
2.1 Post-hoc Interpretability
In order to build explanations for predictions made by a
trained black-box model, post-hoc interpretability approaches
generally rely on sampling instances and labelling them with
the model to gather information about its behavior, either
locally around a prediction [Ribeiro et al., 2016] or glob-
ally [Craven and Shavlik, 1996]. These instances are then
used to approximate the decision function of the black-box
and build understandable explanations, either using a surro-
gate model (e.g. a linear model [Ribeiro et al., 2016] or a
decision tree [Hara and Hayashi, 2016]), or by computing
meaningful coefficients [Turner, 2015; Lundberg and Lee,
2017]). Other methods rely on using specific instances to
build explanations using comparison to relevant neighbors,
such as prototype-based approaches [Kim et al., 2014] and
counterfactual explanation approaches.
Instead of simply identifying important features, the lat-
ter aim at finding the minimal perturbation required to alter
the prediction of a given observation. A counterfactual ex-
planation is thus a data instance, close to this observation,
that is predicted to belong to a different class. This form of
explanation provides a user tangible explanations that are di-
rectly understandable and actionable, which can be seen as an
advantage. This can be opposed to other explanations using
feature importance vectors, which are arguably harder to use
and to understand for a non-expert user [Wachter et al., 2018].
Several formalizations of the counterfactual problem can be
found in the literature, depending on the formulation of the in-
verse problem and on the used distance. For instance, [Laugel
et al., 2018a] (resp. [Guidotti et al., 2018a]) look for the L2
(resp. L0)-closest instance of an other class, while [Lash et
al., 2017] try to find the instance that has the highest proba-
bility of belonging to another class within a certain maximum
distance. Another example is the formulation as a tradeoff
between the L1 closest instance and a certain classification
score target [Wachter et al., 2018].
2.2 Comparison of Post-hoc Interpretability
Approaches
The post-hoc paradigm, and in particular the need for post-
hoc approaches to use instances that were not used to train
the model to build their explanations, raises questions about
their relevance and usefulness. Several troublesome issues
have been identified: [Baehrens et al., 2010] e.g. notice that
modeling the decision function of a black-box classifier with
a surrogate model trained on generated instances can result in
explanation vectors that point in the wrong directions in some
areas of the feature space in a trivial problem. The stabil-
ity of post-hoc explainer systems has been criticized as well,
showing that some of these approaches are locally not stable
enough [Alvarez Melis and Jaakkola, 2018] or on the contrary
too stable and thus not locally accurate enough [Laugel et al.,
2018b].
However, there seems to have been few works [Lipton,
2017; Rudin, 2018] questioning the post-hoc paradigm itself,
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Figure 1: Two classifiers have been trained on 80% of the dataset (a
2D version of the iris dataset) and have the same accuracy over the
test set, 0.78. Left picture: because of its low robustness, the random
forest classifier makes questionable generalizations (e.g. small red
square in the dark blue region) Right picture: the support vector
classifier makes questionable decisions in regions far away from the
training data (red area in the top left corner).
and wondering about the risks of generating explanations that
are disconnected from the ground truth. The work of [Kabra
et al., 2015] can be related to this issue, as it attempts to iden-
tify which neighbors from the training data are the most in-
fluential for a given prediction made by a trained classifier.
However, their approach relies on retraining the classifier to
induce a notion of causality, and thus lies beyond the post-
hoc context. In a similar fashion, [Jiang et al., 2018] try to
identify which predictions can be trusted in regard to ground
truth instances based on their distance to training data.
3 Ground-truth Justification
This section presents motivations and formalization for the
notion of ground-truth justification, central to this paper.
3.1 Motivations
The notion of ground-truth justification we seek aims at mak-
ing a distinction between an explanation that has been gen-
erated because of some previous knowledge (such as training
data) and one that would be a consequence of an artifact of
the classifier. In the post-hoc paradigm, explainer systems do
not have access to the training data; making this distinction is
thus not trivial. In the case of counterfactual explanations that
rely on specific instances, the risk would be having counter-
factual instances (i.e. predictions from another class) caused
by these artifacts. Artifacts can be created in particular be-
cause of a lack of robustness of the model, or because it is
forced to make a prediction for an observation in an area that
was not being covered by the training set. Fig. 1 shows an
illustration of how easily such situations can arise in a triv-
ial problem. In both cases, some regions can be found where
the classifier makes questionable improvisations in areas he
has no information about (no training data), either because
it is not robust enough (left image) or because of its com-
plexity (right image). Although not harmful in the context
of prediction (a desirable property of a classifier remains its
ability to generalize to new observations), having an explana-
tion caused by an artifact such that it can not be associated to
any existing knowledge by a human user may be undesirable
in the context of interpretability: for instance, a physician us-
ing a diagnostic tool and an explanation for a prediction that
is not based on existing medical cases would be conceptually
useless, if not very dangerous.
3.2 Definitions
We propose to define this relation between an explanation and
some existing knowledge (ground-truth data used to train the
black-box model) using the topological notion of path, used
when defining the path connectedness of a set. In order to be
more easily understood and employed by a user, we argue that
the counterfactual instance should be continuously connected
to an observation from the training dataset. The idea of this
justification is not to identify the instances that are respon-
sible for a prediction (such as in the aforementioned work
of [Kabra et al., 2015]), but the ones that are correctly being
predicted to belong to the same class for similar reasons.
Definition 1 (Justification). Given a classifier f : X → Y
trained on a dataset X , a counterfactual example e ∈ X is
justified by an instance a ∈ X correctly predicted if f(e) =
f(a) and if there exists a continuous path h between e and a
such that no decision boundary of f is met.
Formally, e is justified by a ∈ X if: ∃ h : [0, 1]→ X such
that: (i) h is continuous, (ii) h(0) = a, (iii) h(1) = e and (iv)
∀t ∈ [0, 1], f(h(t)) = f(e).
To adapt this continuous notion to the context of a black-
box classifier, we replace the connectedness constraint with
-chainability, with  ∈ R+: an -chain between e and a is a
finite sequence e0, e1, ... eN ∈ X such that e0 = e, eN = a
and ∀i < N, d(ei, ei+1) < , with d a distance metric.
Definition 2 (-justification). Given a trained classifier f :
X → Y trained on a dataset X , a counterfactual example
e ∈ X is -justified by an instance a ∈ X correctly predicted
if f(e) = f(a) and if there exists an -chain {ei}i≤N between
e and a such that ∀i ≤ N, f(ei) = f(e).
This definition is equivalent to approximating the afore-
mentioned function h by a sequence (ei)i:, when  decreases
towards 0, this definition becomes a weak version of Defini-
tion 1. Consequently, we call a justified (resp. unjustified)
counterfactual (written JCF, resp. UCF) a counterfactual ex-
ample that does (resp. does not) satisfy Definition 2.
Setting parameter  then allows to build an -graph of in-
stances classified similarly. Using such a graph to approxi-
mate connectedness is also found in some manifold learning
approaches (e.g. Isomap [Tenenbaum et al., 2000]), where
local neighborhoods help to approximate connectedness and
thus reduce the dimension of the data.
This definition of connectedness can also be related to the
one used in density-based clustering methods, such as the
well-known DBSCAN [Ester et al., 1996]: in DBSCAN, two
parameters  and minPts control the resulting clusters (resp.
outliers), built from the core points, which are instances that
have at least (resp. less than) minPts neighbors in an -
ball. Thus, having an instance being -justified by another is
equivalent to having them both belong to the same DBSCAN
cluster, with parameters minPts = 2 and same .
Figure 2: Illustration of the Local Risk Assessment procedure in the
context of binary classification. Left: Definition and Initial Assess-
ment steps; right: Iteration step.
4 Assessment of the Local Risk of Generating
Unjustified Counterfactuals
The goal of this section is to design a test, the Local Risk
Assessment (LRA) procedure, highlighting the existence of
UCF in low-dimensional structured data.
4.1 LRA Procedure
Given a black-box classifier f : X → Y trained on the
dataset X of instances of X and an instance x ∈ X whose
prediction f(x) is to be explained, the aim is to assess the
risk of generating unjustified counterfactual examples in a lo-
cal neighborhood of x. To do this, we propose a generative
approach that aims at finding which regions of this neighbor-
hood are -connected to an instance of X (i.e. verify Defini-
tion 2). In the rest of the paper, given a subset of instances
A of X , we note Al = {z ∈ A | f(z) = l}. The LRA
procedure, commented below, is detailed in Algorithm 1 and
illustrated in a two-dimensional setting in Fig. 2: the red dot
represents x, the observation whose prediction is to be inter-
preted, while green squares (a0, a1 and a2) are correctly clas-
sified instances from the training set X . The decision bound-
ary of f , the considered binary classifier, is represented by
the black lines.
For clarity purposes, the procedure is split in three steps:
first, the studied area is defined in the Definition step. Then,
an Initial Risk Assessment step is performed in this area. Fi-
nally, if needed, the procedure is repeated in the Iteration step.
Definition Step
We first define the studied local neighborhood, i.e. the
region of x which we are trying to assess the risk of,
as the ball with center x and radius defined by its
distance to its closest neighbor from X correctly pre-
dicted to belong to another class: B(x, d(x, a0)), with
a0 = arg min
z∈Xl 6=f(x)
d(x, z), s.t. f(a0) is correct. The distance
d(x, a0) represents an approximation of the minimal distance
between x and the decision boundary of f , and is hence a rea-
sonable distance to look for counterfactual examples: as it is
-connected to itself, a0 represents a ”close” justified coun-
terfactual explanation by itself. The limit of B(x, d(x, a0))
is illustrated in the left picture of Fig. 2 by the blue dashed
circle.
Initial Assessment Step
A high number n of instances Bx = {xi}i≤n are then sam-
pled in B(x, d(x, a0)) following a uniform distribution and
labelled using f .
Using Definition 2, the goal of LRA is to identify which
instances of Bf(a0)x are connected to X through an -chain.
The process to set the value of  is detailed in Section 4.4. As
mentioned earlier, an easy way to implement this is to use the
clustering algorithm DBSCAN onBf(a0)x ∪{a0}with param-
eter values  and minPts = 2. We note {Ct}t the resulting
clusters and outliers: according to Def. 2, the instances be-
longing to the same cluster as a0 are -justified.
This Initial Assessment step is written in lines 2 to 9 of Al-
gorithm 1, and illustrated in the left image of Fig. 2: instances
are generated in Bx (blue dashed circle; the generated in-
stances are not shown in the illustration), and the ones belong-
ing to Bf(a0)x are assigned to clusters C1 (unjustified at this
step), C2 (justified, since a0 ∈ C2) and C3 (non-justified).
Iteration Step
However, at this step, there is no certainty that the other in-
stances of Bf(a0) are unjustified, as they could simply be
connected to other instances from Xf(a0) than a0, or us-
ing an -path that can not be fully included in the explored
area B(x, d(x, a0)) (see Fig. 2, instances belonging to clus-
terC1 are actually justified by a1 but are not connected within
Bx). To answer this question, we define a1 as the second clos-
est instance of Xf(a0) to x correctly predicted and broaden
the exploration region to the hyperspherical layer defined as:
SL1 = {x ∈ X s.t. d(a0, x0) ≤ d(x, x0) ≤ d(a1, x0)}.
Instances SL1 are generated uniformly in SL1, and the in-
stances from SLf(a0)1 ∪ {a1} can then be assigned either to
previous clusters Ct or to a1 using the same criteria, i.e. if
their minimum distance to an instance of an existing cluster
is less than  (right image of Fig. 2: cluster C1 can now be
connected to a1 through the instances generated in SL1).
This step is repeated by generating hyperspherical layers
defined by all instances from Xf(a0) until all the initial clus-
ters Ct can either be justified or are not being updated by any
new instances anymore (such as cluster C3 of Fig. 2, which
was not updated between the two iterations). This step is il-
lustrated in the ”while” loop of Algorithm 1, lines 10 to 19).
If some non-connected clusters are still being updated when
all instances from the training set have been explored (e.g.
red region in the top left corner of the left picture of Fig. 1),
they are considered as non-connected.
In the end, the LRA procedure returns nJ (resp. nU )
the number of JCF (resp. UCF) originally generated
in B(x, d(x, a0)). If nU > 0, there exists a risk of generating
unjustified counterfactual examples in the studied area.
4.2 Metrics
Using these results, we evaluate the proportion of generated
UCF with the 2 criteria:
Sx = 1nU>0 and Rx =
nU
nU + nJ
.
We are mainly interested in Sx, which labels the studied
instance x as being vulnerable to the risk (i.e. having a non-
null risk). The risk itself, measured byRx, describes the like-
Algorithm 1 Local risk assessment
Require: x, f , X
1: Sort correctly predicted instances from X l 6=f(x) =
{a0, a1, ...} in increasing order of their distance to x
2: Bx = {xi}i≤n ∼ Uniform(B(x, a0))
3:  = max
xi∈Bx
min
xj∈Bx
d(xi, xj)
4: Bf(a0)x = {xi ∈ Bx : f(xi) = f(a0)}
5: {Ct}t ← DBSCAN(Bf(a0)x ∪ {a0}, ,minPts = 2)
6: CJ = {Ct0} s.t. a0 ∈ Ct0 ; nJ = |CJ |
7: CNC = {Ct}t \ Ct0 ; nNC = |CNC |
8: CU = {} ; nU = 0
9: k = 0
10: while nNC > 0 do
11: k = k + 1
12: SLk = {xi}i ∼ Uniform(SLk)
13: SLf(ak)k = {xi ∈ SLk : f(xi) = f(ak)}
14: {C ′t}t ← DBSCAN(SLf(ak)k ∪ {ak}, ,minPts = 2)
15: Update CJ and CNC with {C ′t}t
16: Update CU whith clusters from CNC that are not grow-
ing anymore
17: Update nJ , nU and nNC
18: end while
19: return nJ , nU
lihood of having an unjustified counterfactual example in the
studied area when looking for counterfactual examples.
As these scores are calculated for a specific instance xwith
a random generation component, we are also interested in
their average values S¯ and R¯ for 10 runs of the procedure
for each x and over multiple instances.
4.3 Illustrative Results
For the purpose of giving insights about the procedure re-
sults, a toy dataset (half-moons dataset) is used. A classi-
fier, deliberately chosen for its low complexity (random for-
est classifiers with only 3 trees), is trained on 70% of the
data (98% accuracy on the rest of the dataset). The left im-
age of Fig. 3 shows the result of the LRA procedure for a
specific instance x (yellow instance), exploring the neigh-
borhood B(x, d(x, a0)) (blue circle) delimited by its closest
neighbor from opposite class a0 (orange instance). The red
and blue dots are the instances used to train the classifier,
while the red and blue areas represent its decision function: x
is predicted to belong to the blue class and a0 to the red one.
Within B(x, d(x, a0)), a red square ”pocket” is detected as a
group of unjustified counterfactual examples since there is no
red instance in this pocket: Sx = 1.
This simple example illustrates the fact that the risk of gen-
erating unjustified counterfactual examples does exist. Full
results of the LRA procedure run over multiple instances of
several datasets are available in Section 4.5.
4.4 LRA Parameters: n and 
The values of n and  are obviously crucial since they de-
fine the notion of -justification and impact the average dis-
tance between the number of generated instances n. Broadly
Figure 3: Illustrative result of the Local Risk Assessment procedure
(left: Sx = 1) and the Vulnerability Evaluation test (right: Jx = 1)
for an instance of the half-moons dataset.
speaking, the higher n and the smaller  are, the better the
approximation of the topology of the local neighborhood is:
if the value of n is too low, small ”pockets” of unjustified
counterfactual examples might be missed. Similarly, if the
value of  is too high, an -chain will not be a good approxi-
mation of a connected path between two instances. However,
there is obviously a tradeoff between this accuracy and the
computation time of the algorithm, the complexity of which
can be evaluated to be at worst O(pn2), with p the size of
Xf(a0). In practice, because the instances Bx are gener-
ated before running DBSCAN, we can set it to the maxi-
mum value of the distances of B to their closest neighbors:
 = max
xi∈Bx
min
xj∈Bx\{xi}
d(xi, xj). However, this requires the
whole procedure to be run several time to make sure  does
not take an absurd value (e.g. in the case where one single
instance would be generated far away from the others). Thus,
the problem becomes of setting the value of n alone.
The role of parameter n is to make sure that the explored
area is ”saturated” enough and that no subtelty of the model’s
decion border, as well as potential unjustified counterfactual
examples, are left undetected. Thus, for each observation x
we assume there exists a threshold above which the complex-
ity of the decision boundary of f would be fully ”captured”.
When this value is met, increasing n has very little impact
over the found clusters and therefore on the risk scoreRx. We
validate this intuition empirically by looking at the evolution
ofRx depending on n for multiple instances, but due to space,
do not include the results in the present paper. However, the
obtained results and code to reproduce them are available in
an online repository (https://github.com/thibaultlaugel/truce).
Although seemingly high, the complexity of the LRA proce-
dure is not seen as an issue as it is proposed as a diagnostic
tool, rather than used to generate explanations by a user.
4.5 Quantitative Results
This section describes the datasets and approaches used in the
experiments. For each considered dataset, a train-test split of
the data is performed with 70%-30% proportion, and a binary
classifier is trained. To mitigate the impact the choice of the
classifier would make, we use the same classifier for every
dataset, a random forest (RF) with 200 trees. However, we
also train a Support Vector classifier (SVC) with Gaussian
kernel on one of the Boston dataset (see below) to make sure
Dataset S¯ R¯ [%]
Iris 0.41 0.05 (0.04)
Half-moons 0.37 7.01 (17.1)
BostonRF 0.63 16.0 (25.2)
BostonSVC 0.29 6.1 (13.6)
Recidivism 0.81 26.6 (30.8)
Table 1: Proportion of instances being at risk (average S score) over
the test sets, and risk (average percentage and standard deviation
values of R) of generating an UCF for 5 datasets.
the highlighted issue is not a characteristic feature of random
forests.
The test set is then used to run the experiments: for each
instance it contains, Algorithm 1 is run and scores R¯ and S¯
are calculated. The code and data to reproduce all the experi-
ments are available online in the aforementioned repository.
Datasets
The datasets considered for these experiments include 2 low-
dimensional datasets (half-moons and iris) as well as 2 real
datasets: Boston Housing [Harrison and Rubinfeld, 1978]
and Propublica Recidivism [Larson et al., 2016]. These struc-
tured datasets are commonly used in the interpretability (and
fairness) literature.
Results
The results of the Local Risk Assessment procedure are
shown in Table 1. Among all the considered datasets, be-
tween 29% and 81% of the studied instances have unjustified
counterfactual examples in their neighborhood (Sx=1).
An important thing to note is that the R¯ score varies greatly
between the instances of a single dataset (high standard devi-
ation), as well as between the datasets. This can be explained
by the local complexity of both the used datasets and clas-
sifiers. Supposedly, an instance located far away from the
decision boundary of the classifier will have greater chance
to generate unjustified counterfactual examples than an in-
stance located closer, since the neighborhood explored by the
Local Risk Assessment procedure will be much wider. More
generally, these results depend on assumptions such as char-
acteristics of the classifier (SVC with Gaussian kernel seems
to achieve better results than RF), of the data (dimensional-
ity, density) as well as its labels (number of classes, classes
separability), and the classifier’s accuracy. These have not
been studied here as they lie out of the frame of this work,
but are somehow illustrated by the variability of R¯ between
datasets. The learning algorithm of the classifier itself may
also have an impact, as models such as logistic regression or
1-NN classifier have, by design, no UCF (S¯ = 0.0). Thus,
the link between connectedness and overfitting is not obvious
and needs to be further explored.
These results confirm the intuition that the risk of generat-
ing UCF exists and is important. In this context, since they
do not have the ability to distinguish a ground-truth backed
decision from a classifier artifact, post-hoc counterfactual ap-
proaches are vulnerable to this issue. The next section studies
the extent of this vulnerability.
5 Vulnerability of Post-hoc CF Approaches
Once the risk of generating UCF has been established, we
analyze how troublesome it is for existing counterfactual ap-
proaches. This section presents a second procedure, called
Vulnerability Evaluation, which aims at assessing how a post-
hoc interpretability method behaves in the presence of UCF.
5.1 Vulnerability Evaluation Procedure: VE
The goal of the VE procedure is to assess the risk for state of
the art methods to generate UCF in vulnerable regions. Given
an instance x ∈ X , we use the LRA procedure to assess the
risk Rx and focus on the instances where this risk is ”signif-
icant” (imposing Rx > 0.25). Using the method to be evalu-
ated, a counterfactual explanation E(x) ∈ X is generated.
To check whether E(x) is justified or not, a similar pro-
cedure as LRA is used: instances BE(x) are generated uni-
formly in a local region defined as the hyperball with cen-
ter E(x) and radius d(E(x), b0), where b0 denotes the clos-
est instance to E(x) correctly predicted to belong to the same
class, i.e. b0 = argmin
xi∈Xf(E(x))
d(E(x), xi). The DBSCAN al-
gorithm is also used with the same parameters as previously.
If E(x) is assigned to the same cluster as the closest instance
to b0, then there exists an -chain linking E(x) and b0, mean-
ing E(x) is a JCF according to Definition 2.
If not, similarly as previously, the explored area is ex-
panded to the hyperspherical layer defined by the distance
to b1, the second closest instance fromXf(E(x) correctly pre-
dicted. This step is repeated by widening the studied area as
many times as necessary: if no instance from Xf(E(x)) can
be connected, then E(x) is labelled as being unjustified.
As for state of the art methods, we focus on the approaches:
HCLS [Lash et al., 2017], Growing Spheres [Laugel et al.,
2018a] and LORE [Guidotti et al., 2018a] (modified to return
counterfactual examples rather than rules).
5.2 Metrics
The goal being to check wether a counterfactual example
E(x) is justified or not, we simply define the justification
score JE(x) as a binary score that equals 1 if E(x) is justi-
fied, 0 in the other case. Again, we also measure the average
value J¯ of JE(x) over multiple instances and multiple runs.
5.3 Illustrative Results
The considered post-hoc counterfactual approaches are ap-
plied to a toy dataset to illustrate how they can behave, in
the aforementioned setup (see Section 4.3), see Fig. 3 (right
image). As this instance has a risk score Rx ≥ 0.25,
we apply VE. A counterfactual example is generated using
HCLS [Lash et al., 2017] with budget B = d(x, b0). The
output E(x) is represented by the green instance. In this situ-
ation,E(x) lies in the unjustified area, meaning HCLS gener-
ated an unjustified counterfactual example (JE(x) = 0). This
example illustrates the fact that, when there is a consequent
risk Rx, post-hoc approaches are vulnerable to it.
5.4 Quantitative Results
The results of the VE procedure are shown in Table 2. As
expected, when confronted to situations with a local risk of
Dataset HCLS GS LORE
Iris 0.63 0.63 0.70
Half-moons 0.83 0.67 0.83
BostonSVC 0.95 0.93 1.0
BostonRF 0.86 0.84 1.0
Recidivism 0.94 0.94 0.98
Table 2: Proportion of generated counterfactuals that are justified
(J¯) for vulnerable instances (Rx ≥ 0.25)
generating unjustified counterfactual examples (Rx ≥ 0.25),
the considered approaches fail to generate JCF: the propor-
tion of generated JCF with state of the art approaches can
fall as low as 63 %. This confirms the assumption that post-
hoc counterfactual approaches are, by construction, vulnera-
ble to the studied issue. Among the considered approaches,
HCLS seems to achieve slightly better performance than GS.
This could be explained by the fact that HCLS tries to maxi-
mize the classification confidence, leading to counterfactuals
that may be located further from x than GS and hence with
a higher chance of avoiding unjustified classification regions.
The same observation and conclusion can be made for LORE,
which minimizes a L0 norm. Hence, connectedness seems to
be able to be favored at the expense of the distance.
Again, a major variability in J¯ can be observed between in-
stances. This confirms the previously made assumption that
the connectedness of the classes predicted by f heavily de-
pends on the data and considered classifier.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we propose a justification definition that coun-
terfactual explanations should satisfy, motivated by an intu-
itive requirement based on path connectedness. We propose
a procedure to assess the risk of generating unjustified coun-
terfactual examples in the post-hoc context, and additionally
show that post-hoc counterfactual explanations are indeed
vulnerable to such risk.
In this context, we argue that there is no existing satisfying
way to provide post-hoc explanations that are both faithful
to the classifier and to ground-truth data and further research
is necessary. In the mean time, using the train instances, al-
though not always possible in the utilisation context of post-
hoc methods, seems to remain necessary.
In light of this study, further works include adapting the
current procedure to high-dimensional data and making a
more in-depth study of the role of the classifier’s complex-
ity in justification. Prospective works also include studying
the connectedness of adversarial examples, as ongoing ex-
periments suggest that they verify the proposed justification
definition.
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